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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

ST.A_TE OF l,.'r_A_H,
Appellant,
-vs.i\L R.

Case No. 7830

BRl~CE~

Respondent.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about September 14th, 1951, M. R. Bruce, defendant and respondent herein, delivered to one LeGrand
Smith, an automobile dealer in S.panish Fork, Utah, at
Smith's place of business in Spanish F;ork, a post-dated
check drawn on the Eighth South Branch, First Security
Bank of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, in the amount of
$1075.00. This check was uttered in payment for six used
~
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automobiles (Tr. 27, 28). The check.was dated September
17, 1951. It was deposited in .the due course of business,
but :was. rejected by the bank "for the fact that the account had been closed'' (Tr. 30, 47), and this fact was
noted on the check when it was returned to Mr. Smith.
The state's evidence showed that· the account of
M. R. Bruce had been closed by the bank on August 22,
1951, "for reasons of overdraft," and that several checks
drawn by said M. R. Bruce had been returned because of
insufficient funds between the period of August 3rd, and
August 22nd, 1951; further, than no arrangements for
credit had been made with the bank, by Bruce, after his
account had been closed on August 22nd, 1951 (Tr. 46,
47, 48, 49). Defendant was bound over from the City
Court of Provo for trial in the District Court of the
Flourth District. A jury was impanelled and sworn. Defendant did not testify nor did he produce any witnesses.
At the close of the state's evidence, the court entertainedand granted defendant's motion for dismissal (Tr. 50,
51), whereupon, the state appealed from the decision of
the lower court.

STATEMENT OF' POINTS
POINT I ..
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING THE CASE
FROM T.HE _JURY BY GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION,
TO DISMISS.

4
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.A.RGUl\;fENT

POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING THE CASE
FROl\I THE JURY BY GRANTING DEFEND.A.NT'S lVIOTION
TO DISlVIISS.

It is appellant's vie'v of this case that the only question to be deter1nined is 'vhether a post-dated check issued
and delivered under circun1stances in evidence here, falls
w·ithin the provisions of 105-18-11 UCA, 1943, as amended: if it does, the ruling of the lo,ver court is error.
There is a division. of authority as to 'vhether a postdated check is such an instrument as is contemplated
under the provisions of the various "cold check" statutes.
The question can be found annotated in 95 ALR 496, IX.
Post dated Checks.
103-18-11, as amended by Ch. 87, L. Utah, 1945, provides:

Any person 'vho for himself or,as the agent oi.
representative of another or as an officer of a ·
corporation, willfully, 'vith intent to defraud,
n1akes or draws or utters or delivers any check,
or draft or order upon any bank or depositary, or
person, or firm, or corporation, for the payment of
n1oney, knowing at the time of such 1naking, drawing, uttering, or delivering that the maker or
dra-\ver or the corporation has not sufficient funds
in, or credit with said bank or depositary, or person, or fir1n, or corporation, for the payment of
such checks, draft or order, in full upon its presentation, although no express representation is
1nade 'vith reference thereto, is punishable by i1n-
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prisonment in the county jail for not more than
one year, or in the state prison for not more than
14 years.
Tlte making, drawing, uttering or delivering
of such check, draft or order as aforesaid, shall
be prirna facie evidence of intent to defraud.

* * *
T,he word "credit" as used herein shall be
construed to mean an arrangement or understanding with the bank or depositary, or person, or
firm or corporation, for the payment of such
check, draft or order.

* * *
In the case of State v. Taylor, 335 l\1o. 460, 73 SW 2d,
378, 95 ALR ~76, the court had 'under consideration a
statute substantially the same as our own in that section
4305, R. S. Mo. 1929, includes "any check, draft or order,
for the payment of money, upon any bank or other depository." Our 103-18-11, above quoted covers "any
check, or draft, or order upon any bank or despositary
* * * for the payment of money * * *." The Missouri
court in holding that a post-dated check falls within the
provisions of their statute reasoned that such was so,
because the legislature in enacting their false check
statute had done so at a time after the Negotiable Instruments Law had become a part of the law of the State of
Missouri, and therefore, must have had. the provisions
of that law 'in mind. The court pointed out, in an exhaustive discussion of the Negotiable Instruments Law, that a
check, as defined by said law, even though post-dated, is
nevertheless, an instrument which would be included

6
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\Yithin the \Yords •'check," Hdraft," or ••order" as used in
the false check statute. It is to be noted that our false
cheek statute \Yas enacted long after the Negotiable lnstrmnents La\v had becoine the la\v of the State of Utah.
The Supren1e (_---court of ('1alifornia in the case of
People v. Bercovitz, 163 Cal. 636, 126 P. 479, upheld a
conviction under their false check statute where the check
\Vas postdated . ..._'\.t page 480, the court s~id:

* * * Even if 've assume in accord with appellant's clain1 that, by reason of the fact that the
instrtuuent \vas postdated, it vvas not a "check"
vvithin the meaning of that word as used in section
476a, Penal Code, 'vhich vve do not concede, it
''yas clearly a "draft," the giving of which under
such circu~nstances is likev1ise inhibited by the
section, the language being •'any check or. draft,"
* * *
* * * There is nothing in the language used
having the effect of excepting a case. from the
operation of the statute merely because the "c~eck
or draft" is postdated. * * *
To the same effect see State v. Avery, 111 Kan. 588, 207
P. 838.
The court's attention is respectfully· directed to the
fact that the cases cited in the above referred to annota- ·
tion, which hold that criminal liability can not be based
on the issuance of a postdated check, do so, with one exception, either on the ground that the statute under consideration did not include the 'vords "draft or order,"
or because the evidence showed that the payee was in7
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formed there 'vere not sufficient funds to meet the check
and there would not be until the date indicated on the
(·heck. In this regard, it is to be observed that the Missouri case cited by appellant does not consider fatal the
fact that the payee knew or had reason to know that the
e.heck was postdated. The California case deals with facts
silnilar to thoNe in the instant case, in that the payee did
not know that the drawer did not have sufficient funds
to cover the check on the day of delivery.
In State v. Trogstad, 98 Utah 565, 100 P2d 564, this
court held that the drawing of a che~k against insufficient
funds was not culpable conduct on the part of the drawer,
because the payee understood there were no funds available and that she was to hold the check a few days until
there were. This court said these circumstances created a
borrower and lender relationship because the payee
treated the check as a promise to pay, therefore rebutting any idea that the check was delivered with intent to
defraud.
In the Trogstad case, supra, the court addressed itself to Section 11 of Chapter 18, Title 103, R.S.U., 1933.
That statute, insofar as the elements of the crime are
concerned, is identical to the present statute, above quoted. The court on pag~ 566 said :
The statute provides that there must be
proved (a) an intent to defraud, and (b) a kno,vledge that the maker or drawer did not have (1)
sufficient funds or (2) credit with the bank for
payment. The essence of the charge is that the
injured party must have relied upon son1e false
8
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and deceitful pretl~nse. ~rhe check 1nust have been
dra,vn, uttered or delivered \villfully and \vith
the intent to defraud and kno,ving there \vas
neither ~ufficient fund8 nor credit with the firrn or
person upon "Tho1n it \\Ta8 dra\vn.
The specifie intent to defraud n1ust be found
fron1 the e\?idence. Such intent n1ust be shown to
exist in the n1ind of the rnaker or dra\Yer. Intent
n1ny be found frorn the circtunstances. * * *
The eourt in further justifying its reversal of the conviction said on page 567 :
\\. . hen it is proven that there is no account, an
inference ·n1ay arise that there is not" credit but a
erirninal conviction may not rest upon such inference alone. :iliay the state rest vvhen it has established there is no account~ It rnust be shovvn, further, that there is no credit. r_rhere n1ay be "no
account," or ''insufficient funds" and yet there
may be credit. This essential element vvas ·not
proved.
It is respectfully submi-tted that the evidence adduced by the state in the instant case establish-es that the
dravver, respondent herein, knew he did not have sufficient funds to cover the check; further, that he knew he
did not have u credit with the bank for payment." The
testimony of Ronald H. Haslarn, an employee of the
drawee bank, makes these two facts clear. On direct exarnination ~Ir. Haslam, testifying from the permanent
records of the bank, states as follows: (Tr. 48, 49)
closed~

Q.

vVhen was the account

A.

An August the 22nd, 1951.
9
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Q.

And you say for what reason was it closed?

A.

There was an overdraft shown on the books
of $1.36, :x· * *

Q.

Was there any funds in that l\L R. Bruce account on Septernber 15, 1951 ~

A.

No * * *.

Q.

Was there any money deposited in that account after August 22, 1951 ~

A.

No, sir.

Q.

Is there any indication on the account as to
checks being returned for insufficient funds~

A.

Yes, sir, there are several.

Q. Where are_ they~
A.

They're from August the 3rd to August the
22nd.

* * *
Q.

IIave you made a search of your records to
ascertain whether or not there was any arrangen1ents made at the bank for creditto ~L
· I~. Bruce after this account 'vas closed~

A.

Yes, sir.

Q.

State what you found.

A.

There was no such record of any arrangement.

Q. Was any arrangemenf for ·additional credit
ever made by this defendant~
A.

No, sir.

The testimony of Mr. Smith, the complaining witness
makes it clear that he accepted the check as present pay10
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'

ment for the six auto1nobiles, and that he was not informed that the eheek \Ya8 postdated (Tr. 29, 30).

Q.
'
~\..

Q.
:\..
Q.
.A..

Q.

Did you have any conversation with the defendant about the check~
No, there \vas nothing said particularly. Only
ordinary eonversation. He did say he'd like
the titles to give to his bank at the tiine.
And that's \vhy you gave. him the titles~
That's right.
-vv· ell, \vas there anything said at all about
your holding the check~
Nothing was said at all.
Did you notice that the check was dated the
17th ?
0

..c\..

No.

/

The fact that n1r. Smith deposited the check on the
15th of Septe1nber, 1951~ further bolsters the argun1ent
that he treated the check as a present pajrnent as of the
day of delivery, and that he had no indication of the post. · · dating ( Tr. 30, 31).
On cross-examination ~Ir. Smith testified as' follows:
(Tr·. 36)

Q.

* * * In other words, didn't he (Bruce) say
he would have to finance the automobiles vvith
-a finance company before the check would be
·good~
:'"

A.

I don't think he did. All he asked was-

Q.

Just a moment. You said you don't think he
djd ..Are you sure that he didn't~ Are you
sure1 ·
11 ~
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A. I'm sure he didn't. All he said was he needed
the titles to give to his bank. Of course, you
can assume the fact, that he needed them, the
titles, so he could floor. You can assume it
either way.
THE COURr_r: Did you assume
A.

that~

No, I didn't assun1e that.

We respectfully submit that the testimony of Mr.
IIaslam and n{r. Smith is not inconsonant with the establishrnent of a prima facie case. Indeed, circumstances
such as those described by these two witnesses furnish
sufficient basis for an inference of intent to defraud;
therefore, the case should have been submitted to the
jury. It is .further to be noted that our statute provides
that the drawing of a check, draft or order as contemplated by the statute is prima facie evidence of intent to
defraud. See State v. Prettyman, 113 Utah 36, 191 P2d
142.

CONCLUSION

Respondent respectfully submits that a review of the
transcript and proceedings in this case. discloses ample
and sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case;
that a postdated check is such an instrument as was contemplated by the legislature when it enacted the false
check statute and inserted the words "check, ·draft, or
order;" and that particularly is this s~ when the payee ·

12
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is not apprised of the postdating. The ruling of the lo'\ver
court should be reversed.
\

Respectfully submitted,

CLINTON D. VERNON
. A.ttorney General
RICHARD J. MAUGIIAN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for App-ellant
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